A popular technique for tolerating malicious faults in open distributed systems is to establish small groups of participants, each of which has a non-faulty majority. These groups are used as building blocks to design attack-resistant algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Byzantine fault tolerance addresses the challenge of performing useful work when participants in the system are malicious. Participants, or identifiers (IDs) in the system, may be malicious; these malicious IDs can discard or corrupt information that is routed through them or stored on them.
A popular technique for overcoming these challenges is to arrange IDs into sets called groups, 1 where each has a nonfaulty majority. We can then ensure the following:
• Secure routing is possible. For groups G 1 and G 2 along a route, all members of G 1 transmit messages to all members of G 2 . This all-to-all exchange, followed by majority filtering by each non-faulty ID in G 2 , guarantees correctness of communication between groups despite malicious IDs.
• Computation is performed by all members of a group via protocols for Byzantine agreement (BA) [28] , or more general secure multiparty computation [49] , to guarantee that tasks execute correctly. In this way, each group simulates a reliable processor upon which jobs can be run.
The use of groups provides a scalable approach to designing an attack-resistant distributed system, by avoiding the need to have all n IDs perform BA in concert. This work is supported by the National Science Foundation grants CCF 1613772, TWC 1318880, and CCF 1613772, and by a C Spire research gift. Authorship is listed in alphabetical order. Corresponding author email: my325@msstate.edu 1 Such sets have appeared under different names in the literature, such as "swarms" [18] , "clusters" [21] , and "quorums" [51] . Our choice of "groups" aligns with pioneering work in this area [7] .
Designing attack-resistant systems using groups has been an active topic of research for over a decade, with many results [8] - [10] , [12] , [18] , [21] , [23] , [26] , [27] , [37] , [39] , [45] , [51] . Yet, despite this progress, an enduring requirement is that each group contains O(log n) members; that is, the group size grows logarithmically in n.
Why does this logarithmic size matter? At first glance, it is an unlikely bottleneck. However, since groups are building blocks for the system, their size, |G|, impacts costs:
(i) Cost of Group Communication. Group members must often act in concert; for example, executing distributed key generation [51] , or generating random numbers [8] , [18] . Such protocols require messages be exchanged between all members. We label this as group communication and it has Θ(|G| 2 ) message cost.
(ii) Cost of Secure Routing. Routing via all-to-all exchange between two groups incurs Ω(|G| 2 ) message complexity. Given a route of length D, communication between any two groups requires O(D|G| 2 ) messages. 2 (iii) Cost of State Maintenance. Each ID w must maintain state on its neighbors; this includes both the members of all groups to which w belongs and the members of neighboring groups. This requires storing link information, as well as periodically testing links for liveness. 3 In each case above, reducing |G| would directly reduce cost. Unfortunately, in prior results, |G| ≈ log n is key to ensuring that all groups have a non-faulty majority with high probability (w.h.p.). 4 Without this property, all previous group constructions succumb to adversarial attack. A natural question is: Are there new ideas that allow us to decrease |G| while maintaining strong security guarantees? In response, we consider an attacker that controls a constant fraction of the total computational resources in the system. By employing proof-of-work (PoW), we obtain our main result: Group size can be reduced exponentially while still allowing routing in all but a vanishingly small portion (an o(1)-fraction) of the network.
A. Defining ε-Robustness
Consider a system of n IDs and n groups, where a βfraction of IDs are malicious; such IDs may deviate arbitrarily from any prescribed protocol to derail operations in the network. The following defines our notion of ε-robustness: For a small ε > 0, at least (1 − ε)n groups have a non-faulty majority and can securely route messages to each other. The parameter β is a sufficiently small positive constant less than 1/2, and ε = o (1) . We consider the following questions: Is this a useful concept? Consider decentralized storage and retrieval of data. This definition guarantees all but an εfraction of data is reachable and maintained reliably. Example applications include distributed databases, name services, and content-sharing networks. Alternatively, consider n jobs in an open computing platform that are run on individual machines. This definition guarantees that all but an ε-fraction of those jobs can be correctly computed. 5 Is satisfying this definition trivial? Given Θ(n) non-faulty IDs, this definition characterizes simulating (1 − ε)n reliable processors and the ability to route information between them. If we ignore the use of groups or, equivalently, consider groups each consisting of a single ID, then we trivially have (1 − β)n reliable processors, but routing between them is challenging. For example, establishing links between all pairs of IDs will give secure routing, but this is hardly scalable. Do previous solutions solve this problem? Prior results using groups are subsumed by this definition and they address ε = 1/poly(n). In this case, routing is possible -albeit, costlybecause w.h.p. all groups have a non-faulty majority.
To reduce cost, we consider ε = 1/poly(log n). We show how this allows us to reduce the group size exponentially, but at the price of having a small fraction of the groups with a majority of malicious IDs.
B. Related Work
Tolerating Byzantine Faults via Groups. The use of groups for building attack-resistant distributed systems has received significant attention, and all address the case of ε = 1/poly(n).
Early results obtain a poly(log n) factor increase in costs, assuming constraints on the amount of system dynamism [7] , [17] , [18] , [23] , [38] .
Full dynamism was achieved by Awerbuch and Scheideler in a series of breakthrough results [8]- [10] ; they propose a cuckoo rule that w.h.p. preserves a non-faulty majority in all groups over n Θ(1) joins/departures when the system size remains Θ(n). More recently, Guerraoui et al. [21] give similar guarantees when the system size can vary polynomially.
Simulations of the cuckoo rule are conducted in [47] . The trade-off between group size and security is examined, and findings suggest that |G| must be fairly large. For n = 8, 192 (the largest size examined) and β ≈ 0.002, |G| = 64 preserves a non-faulty majority in each group for 10 5 joins/departures; β ≈ 0.07 is possible with suggested improvements in [47] .
Several results have focused on reducing communication costs when the good majority of all groups is guaranteed via an algorithm like the cuckoo rule [45] , [51] . Here too, group size impacts performance and |G| = 30 incurs significant latency in PlanetLab experiments [51] . Groups have also been used in conjunction with quarantining malicious IDs [27] , [43] with limited churn.
Finally, we observe that none of these results explicitly uses PoW, with the possible exception of [7] , where computational challenges or Turing tests are briefly discussed as a means for throttling the join rate of Byzantine IDs. These prior results assume a model where the fraction of Byzantine IDs is always limited to strictly less than 1/2. In contrast, the use of PoW provides a plausible mechanism by which to enforce this limit (see below for more discussion). Attack-Resistance Without Groups. Other distributed constructions exist that do not explicitly use groups [13] , [17] , [44] . However, the associated techniques retain some form of O(log n) redundancy with regards to data placement or route selection and, therefore, incur the typical poly(log n) cost.
In [12] , [26] , [37] , malicious faults are tolerated by routing along multiple diverse routes. However, it is unclear that these systems can provide theoretical guarantees on robustness.
Byzantine resistance when O( √ n/poly(log n)) IDs may depart and join per time step is examined in [2] , [3] . 6 In this challenging model, (roughly) O( √ n) Byzantine IDs can be tolerated. Our result addresses more moderate churn while tolerating Θ(n) Byzantine IDs.
Central authorities (CAs) have been used in prior results [12] , [42] to achieve robustness. While our results can be used in conjunction with a CA, it is not always plausible to assume such an authority is available and immune to attack. For this reason, our work does not depend on a CA. Computational Puzzles. Proof-of-work (PoW) via computational puzzles has been used to mitigate the Sybil attack [14] , whereby an adversary overwhelms a system with a large number of malicious IDs. We note that such PoW schemes have been proposed in decentralized settings; for examples, see [22] , [30] . However, such PoW schemes only limit the number of Sybil IDs -typically commensurate with the amount of computational power available to the adversaryand the problem of tolerating these adversarial IDs must still be addressed by other means; for examples, see [46] , [52] .
A prominent example of using PoW to provide security is Bitcoin [36] . However, note that analyses of Bitcoin and related systems typically assume a communication primitive that allows an ID to disseminate a value to all other IDs within a known bounded constant amount of time despite an adversary [20] , [31] , [33] . In contrast, our results do not assume the existence of such a primitive.
We note that PoW imposes a computational overhead on the system participants. Nonetheless, examples such as Bitcoin and emerging blockchain technologies (for example, Ethereum [16] ) illustrate the success of PoW in practice, and exemplify that computational overhead from PoW may be tolerable given the security guarantees received in exchange.
C. Our Model and Preliminaries
We consider a system of n IDs. An ID is good if it obeys the protocol; otherwise, the ID is Byzantine or bad.
The Adversary. We assume that our adversary controls a βfraction of the computational power in the network, where β is a sufficiently small positive constant less than 1/2. 7 This is a common assumption when using PoW to design attack-resistant, open systems [22] , [30] , [41] . For simplicity, throughout Sections II and III, we assume there is always at most a β fraction of bad IDs. In Section IV, this assumption is justified by proving that the adversary is constrained, via proof-of-work assumptions, to generating (roughly) at most a β-fraction of IDs at any time.
We assume that a single adversary controls all the bad IDs. This is a challenging model since a single adversary allows the bad IDs to perfectly collude and coordinate their attacks. The adversary also knows the network topology and all message contents; however, the adversary does not know the random bits generated locally by any good ID. Groups. In our system, each group has size Θ(log log n). Each ID w has its own group G w and w is referred to as the leader. A group G is good if (i) d 1 ln ln n ≤ |G| ≤ d 2 ln ln n for appropriate constants d 1 < d 2 , and (ii) the number of bad IDs in G is at most (1 + δ)β|G| for some tunably small constant δ > 0 depending only on sufficiently large n; otherwise, the group is bad. Note that groups are not necessarily disjoint; in addition to being the leader of G w , ID w may belong to other groups. Group construction is described in Section III-A. Input Graph. Our result builds off an input graph H on N vertices, where each vertex corresponds to an ID. 8 Each ID is a virtual participant, and each ID is represented as a value in the interval [0, 1) known as the ID space; this is viewed as a unit ring where moving clockwise along the ring corresponds to moving from away from 0 towards 1. The successor of a point x in [0, 1) is the first ID encountered by moving clockwise from x on the unit ring; this is denoted by suc(x). Assuming there is no adversary and that IDs are distributed independently and uniformly at random (u.a.r.) in [0, 1), the following properties hold for H with probability at least 1 − N −c for a tunable constant c ≥ 1.
P1 -Search Functionality.
There exists a search (or routing) algorithm that, for any key value in [0, 1), returns contact information for the ID responsible for the corresponding resource (i.e., data item, computational job, network printer, etc.). A search requires traversing D = O(log N ) IDs. 9 P2 -Load Balancing. A randomly chosen ID is responsible for at most a (1 + δ )/N -fraction of the key values (and the corresponding resources) for an arbitrarily small δ > 0 depending on sufficiently large N .
P3 -Linking Rules. Each ID w links to IDs in a set of neighbors S w ; |S w | = O(log γ n) for some constant γ > 0. Any ID may determine the elements in S w by performing searches. 10 There are also O(poly(log n)) IDs each of which has w in its respective set of neighbors. Again, any ID may verify this by performing searches. The number of links on which ID w is incident is the degree of w, and every ID has the same degree asymptotically. P4 -Congestion Bound. The congestion is C = O(log c n/n) for a constant c ≥ 0, where congestion is the maximum probability (over all IDs) that a ID is traversed in a search initiated at a randomly chosen ID for a randomly chosen point in [0, 1).
We emphasize that H is not assumed to provide any security or performance guarantees if there are bad IDs present. Rather, any such H provides a viable topology that, using our result, can be made to tolerate bad IDs. Note that many constructions for H exist such as Chord [48] , the distance-halving construction [39] , Viceroy [32] , Chord++ [6] , D2B [19] , FISSIONE [29] , and Tapestry [53] .
IDs and PoW in Our
Construction. An ID is a virtual participant in the network, and each ID is represented as a value in [0, 1) in our construction. Note that adequate precision is obtained using O(log n) bits. Important properties that our system guarantees are:
• IDs expire after a period of time that can be set by the system designers. • A claim to own an ID can be verified by any good ID. • The adversary possesses (roughly) at most βn IDs, and these IDs are u.a.r. from the ID space [0, 1). We emphasize that our construction does not take these properties for granted; rather they are enforced via a PoW scheme. However, given space constraints and that the bulk of our results are proved without the need to reference these details, we will assume these properties in Sections II and III. We remove these assumptions in Section IV.
We make the random oracle assumption [11] : there exist hash functions, h, such that h(x) is uniformly distributed over h's range, when any x in the domain of h is input to h for the first time. We assume that both the input and output domains are the real numbers [0, 1). In practice, h may be a cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-2 [40] , with inputs and outputs of sufficiently large bit lengths. Joins and Departures. Our work addresses a dynamic system where IDs may join and depart. We delay our description of this aspect until Section III.
We use the following concentration results. [35] ) Let X 1 , . . . , X N be independent indicator random variables such that Pr(X i ) = p and let X = N i=1 X i . For any δ, where 0 < δ < 1, the following holds:
Theorem 1. (Chernoff Bounds
Then, the following holds:
Finally, all of our results hold given that n is sufficiently large; we assume this throughout.
D. Overview and Our Main Result
As discussed above, reducing group size is desirable, but gives rise to the possibility of bad groups. In Section II, we demonstrate how to achieve 1/poly(log n)-robustness with groups of size Θ(log log n) when there is no churn. This argument leverages the bound on congestion given by the input graph, along with a careful tallying of the fraction of ID space that cannot be securely searched.
This result is applied in Section III where we show that O(1/poly(log n))-robustness can be maintained with churn.
A key component of our construction is the use of two graphs (composed of groups) that, when used in tandem, limit the number of bad groups that can be formed.
Finally, in Section IV, we describe how PoW is used to provide the guarantees on IDs discussed in Subsection I-C. The main challenge is defending against an adversary that wishes to store a large number of IDs for use in a massive future attack (i.e., a pre-computation attack).
Our main result is the following:
Theorem 3. Assume an input graph H that satisfies P 1 -P 4, and that the adversary has at most a β-fraction of the computational power, for some sufficiently small but positive constant β. Then our construction using |G| = O(log log n) provides the following guarantees w.h.p. over a polynomial number of join and departure events.
• All but an O(1/poly(log n))-fraction of groups are good. • All but an O(1/poly(log n))-fraction of IDs can successfully search for all but an O(1/poly(log n))-fraction of the resources. That is, we achieve O(1/poly(log n))-robustness.
To illustrate our cost improvements, we also establish: Corollary 1. Using any of the constructions in [19] , [32] , or [39] as an input graph H, our result gives the following bounds on cost.
Note that these are substantial improvements over the costs described in Section I.
Can we do better?
We offer some intuition for why significantly improving on our result seems unlikely. With |G| = Θ(log log n), the probability of a bad group is roughly 1/poly(log n). All constructions with o(log n) degree requires D = ω(log n/ log log n) IDs to be traversed in a search. Thus, the probability of encountering a bad group along the path of search is (roughly) at most D 1 1/poly(log n) by a union bound, and this can be less than 1.
Now, consider a smaller group size of o(log log n/ log log log n). Then, the probability of a bad group is ω(log log n/ log n), and over D IDs traversed, a union bound no longer bounds the probability of a failed search by less than 1.
In this sense, our choice of |G| appears to be pushing the limits of what is possible when using groups to design attackresistant systems.
II. THE STATIC CASE
We first prove a result for searches without dealing with ID joins and departures.
A. The Group Graph
Given an input graph H, our -robust construction is a group graph G where each ID w in H corresponds to group G w .
We refer to each group in G as blue or red. A blue group corresponds to a good group with its neighbors correctly established, while a red group corresponds to a bad group or a group that has an incorrect neighbor set. When addressing the group graph, we use the notation G w to denote a vertex in G; however, G w may also refer to the group with leader w, and this will be made clear from the context.
In G, each blue group G w has a neighbor set, L w , where for each u that is a neighbor of w in H, the group G u exists in L w ; each red group has an arbitrary neighbor set determined by the adversary. A search in G proceeds over edges in G as it would in H with the corresponding group members participating in the search; this is illustrated in Figure 1 . For an edge (G w , G v ) between two blue groups in G, there are all-to-all links between (at least) the good members in G w and G v .
The following properties of G are useful for our analysis:
where the leader v of G has the same ID in both graphs.
• S2. Each group in G is red independently with probability p f ≤ 1/ log k n for a tunably large constant k > 0 depending only on d 1 ; and blue otherwise.
• S3. Edges incident to blue groups are set according to the topology of H. All other edges are set by the adversary.
The value of p f in S2 corresponds to the probability that a group is bad or does not have the correct neighbor set. To provide intuition for our bound on p f , note that if we select Θ(log log n) IDs u.a.r., then the probability that a majority are bad is O(1/poly(log n)) by a Chernoff bound. A similar bound can be derived on the probability of incorrectly setting up neighbors; there is a subtlety with respect to bounding this probability, and this is discussed in our online version [24] . Keeping p f upper bounded by 1/ log k n when IDs can join and depart is non-trivial. We show how to do this in Section III-B.
Since the adversary controls all red groups, it is free to insert or delete edges between red groups (cf. S3). However, edges involving at least one blue group are not modified. This is because the adversary cannot modify a good group's knowledge of who its neighbors are, since that knowledge is kept consistent by the good majority, although the neighboring bad group may certainly ignore or corrupt incoming messages from that good group. Overview of Analysis. A search in group graph G = (V , E) is said to fail if it traverses any red group. Otherwise, the search will succeed.
In G, consider the path of a search that begins at the initial group and halts either upon succeeding or encountering the first red group (in which case the search fails); we call this a search path.
For any group G v , we define the responsibility of G v to be the probability that a search path in G from a random group to a random point in [0, 1) traverses G v . We denote the responsibility of group G v by ρ(G v ).
Why is responsibility defined in terms of search paths? The issue is that responsibility is not well-defined after a search encounters the first red group since the adversary may redirect a search to any red group after this point. For example, the adversary may have the same red group traversed by multiple different searches, thus arbitrarily inflating the number of searches that traverse this red group. This motivates the notion of a search path. Proof. By property P4, for any vertex v in H, w.h.p. any search initiated at a random vertex for a random point traverses v with probability C = O(log c n/n). The corresponding search path in G terminates either when it is successful or when the first red group is encountered; therefore, the search path is always a subpath of the corresponding path of a search in H. Also, note that any extra edges added between red groups in the G (due to S3) do not affect how the search path proceeds given that the search path terminates at the first red group. Consequently, w.h.p., the corresponding group G v is traversed with probability O(log c n/n).
B. Analysis
Let X be a random variable that is the probability that a search that begins at a randomly-chosen group for a random point in [0, 1) fails. The randomness of X depends on which groups are red.
Proof. For any group G v , let the random variable
Then, by Lemma 1, and the fact that each group is red with probability at most
is red, and 0 otherwise. We will bound v X v , which we again note is always at least as large as X. Let f (X 1 , ..., X n ) = v X v , where we index the groups by 1 to n. By Lemma 1, for any
Thus, we can apply Theorem 2 with c 2 i = O(log 2c n/n 2 ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We have that:
for some constant d > 0. Let > 0 be an arbitrarily small constant, and set λ = p f log c n, which is at least / log k−c n, by S2. Then, we have: 
III. THE DYNAMIC CASE
We now consider the case where IDs can join and depart. We still make the assumptions about IDs described in Section I-C. Time is divided into disjoint consecutive windows of T steps called epochs indexed by j ≥ 1.
Model of Joins and Departures.
We assume that n IDs are always present even under churn; that is, when an ID departs, another is assumed to join; this is a popular model considered in much of the previous literature on tolerating Θ(n) Byzantine faults; for example, [7] - [10] , [13] , [17] , [18] , [23] , [38] . Additionally, our results hold when the system size is Θ(n) -that is, the size changes by a constant factor -but we omit these details in this extended abstract.
Recall that a good group G contains at most a (1 + δ)βfraction of bad IDs where β > 0 is a sufficiently small constant, and δ > 0 is a tunably small constant depending only on sufficiently large n. We assume the following: in any epoch, at most an ( /2)-fraction of good IDs depart any group, where = 1 − 2(1 + δ)β. This value of ensures that a good group retains a good majority over its lifetime. For ease of exposition in our analysis of the dynamic case, we revise our definition of a good group to be: a group G that begins with size d 1 ln ln n ≤ |G| ≤ d 2 ln ln n and with at most a (1 + δ)β-fraction of bad IDs, and retains a good majority. In practice, the length of an epoch, T , may be set appropriately by the system designers based on the expected rate of departures, and the value of can be increased by increasing d 1 . Algorithmic Overview. In any epoch j, there are:
, each with n IDs. • two new group graphs G j 1 and G j 2 , each with ≤ n IDs. We emphasize that the use of two group graphs per epoch is critical. A naive approach is to use a single group graph in the current epoch in order to build a new group graph in the next epoch. However, this approach will fail because errors from bad groups will accumulate over time. Below we give some intuition for why.
Informally, in epoch j, we have a process where (1) bad groups build new bad groups, and (2) good groups build bad groups with some failure probability p j f > 0 that depends on the current number of bad groups. Therefore, in the next epoch j + 1, the population of bad groups has increased and so has p j+1 f . Left unchecked, this increasing error probability will surpass the desired value of 1/ log k n. By using two group graphs, we can upper bound p j f by this value. The new group graphs are built using the old group graphs over the n deletions and additions that occur in the current epoch j; we describe this in Subsection III-A. By the end of epoch j, the old group graphs G j−1 1 and G j−1 2 are no longer needed, and the new ones G j 1 and G j 2 are complete.
A. Building New Group Graphs
We describe how the new group graphs G j 1 and G j 2 are created. We assume the correctness of two initial group graphs G 0 1 and G 0 2 with neighbor sets for blue groups correctly established. This aligns with prior literature in the area and more discussion is given in our online version [24] . Later, in Section III-B, we prove that w.h.p. this construction preserves ε-robustness.
Preliminaries. Assume the system is in epoch j ≥ 1. Each good ID v already in the system uses the same ID in both
Any ID (already participating in the system or a newcomer) that wishes to participate in the next epoch j + 1 must begin generating an ID by the halfway point of the current epoch j.
Generating this ID requires an expenditure of computational power as described in Section IV.
Recall from Section I-C that IDs expire after a tunable period of time. Upon creation, the new ID will be active throughout epoch j + 1 allowing v to initiate searches via G v and for v to be added to other groups. When v's ID expires, the group G v (this includes v) should remain in both old graphs for an additional T steps. During these steps, G v will forward communications, but v cannot initiate searches using G v , nor can v be added to new groups; we say that v's ID is passive.
For any group G v , if the leader v departs the system, G v remains. That is, the members of G v still persist as a the group G v in their respective active or passive states. We discuss departures further below in the context of updating links.
IDs are assumed to know when the system came online (i.e. step 0). 11 Since T is set when the system is designed, any ID that wishes to join knows when the current epoch ends and the next one begins. Some synchronization between devices is implicit. In practice, this is rarely a problem given the nearubiquitous Internet access (see the Network Time Protocol [34] ) available to users.
A new ID joins the new group graph by a bootstrapping group denoted by G boot . 12 Throughout, we assume that a joining ID knows a good bootstrapping group; we discuss this further in our online version [24] .
Making a Group-Membership Request. In epoch j, group graphs G j 1 and G j 2 are built using searches in G j−1
. An ID w uses the same ID in G j 1 and G j 2 . G w is added to G j 1 as follows. The i th member of G w is suc(h 1 (w, i)) (recall the notation in Section I-C) in the old group graphs for i = 1, ..., d 2 ln ln n where h 1 is a secure hash function and d 2 is defined with respect to group size in Section I-C. That is, in both G j−1 1 and G j−1 2 , a search for each successor of h 1 (w, i) is performed; this is executed by the bootstrapping group and suc(h 1 (w, i)) is solicited for membership in G w . Note that if different IDs are returned by the two searches, the successor to h 1 (w, i) is selected.
How is ln ln n estimated? A standard technique for estimating ln n to within a constant factor is as follows. For u.a.r. IDs, the distance d(u, v) between any two IDs u and v satisfies α n 2 ≤ d(u, v) ≤ α ln n n w.h.p., depending only on sufficiently large positive constants α , α Therefore, w.h.p. ln ln ( 1 d(u,v) ) = ln ln(n) + O(1); this approach works even when an adversary decides to omit some (or all) of its IDs (see Chapter 4 in [50] ), which is considered in Section III-B.
During epoch j, all IDs in G j−1 1 and G j−1 2 are activeand will remain in a passive state over the next epoch j + 1 -and so can be used as members for new groups in G j 1 . Finally, a similar process occurs to build G w in G j 2 , except that a different secure hash function, h 2 , is used. That is, a search for the successors of h 2 (w, i) occurs in both G j−1 1 and G j−1 2 . Note that the membership of G w is likely different in each group graph.
Making a Neighbor Request. If w and u are neighbors in the input graph, then G w and G u should be neighbors in the group graph; recall that this entails all-to-all links between the good members of both groups. To set up the neighbors of G w , G boot performs a search on behalf of w to locate each such neighbor u in both old group graphs (again, favoring the successor if the results differ). In this way, G boot allows u (and G u ) to learn about w and agree to set up a link in the respective group graph.
Verifying Requests. The adversary may attempt to have many good IDs join as neighbors or members of a bad group. This attack is problematic since good IDs will have resources consumed by maintaining too many neighbors or joining too many groups; this increases the state cost (see Section I). To prevent this attack, any such request must be verified: Verifying a Group-Membership Request. When ID u in G j−1 1 is asked to become a member of group G w in G j 1 , ID u must verify that this request aligns with the linking rules; recall that this is assumed possible by property P3 of the input graph.
To do this verification, u performs a search on h 1 (w, i) in both group graphs G j−1 1 and G j−1 2 . If either returns u, then the request is considered verified and u becomes a neighbor of w; otherwise, the request is rejected. Note that u may erroneously reject a membership request; the impact on establishing good groups is addressed in Lemma 7. Conversely, u may erroneously accept a membership request, the impact of this on expected state cost is addressed in Lemma 10. Verifying a Neighbor Request. An ID u that is asked to become a neighbor of ID w, and thus establish links between the members of G u and G w , must also verify this request. Similar to a group-membership request, u will determine via a search in G j−1 1 and G j−1 2 whether u should indeed be a neighbor of w. If either search returns u, then the request is verified and u becomes a neighbor of w; otherwise, the request is rejected.
Note that u may erroneously reject a neighbor request; this is addressed in Lemma 8. Also, u may erroneously accept a request; the impact on expected state cost is addressed in Lemma 10. . Searches are performed by forwarding the request to G boot , and executing the search from that position. Since G boot was active when w joined, then G boot should remain -even if in a passive state -to facilitate searches for another T steps.
Over the duration of epoch j, a group G w may not be able to reliably perform searches in the new group graphs G j 1 and G j 2 since they are still under construction. For example, w might be the first ID to join G j 1 and G j 2 . Once epoch j + 1 starts, the new group graphs G j 1 and G j 2 are to be used. At this point, group G w will initiate any search using its own links in these graphs, rather than relying on G boot which may no longer be present in the system. Updating Links. When a new ID (and its corresponding group) is added to the group graphs G j 1 and G j 2 that are under construction, a group G w must update its neighbor links in G j 1 and G j 2 if this new ID is a better match as a neighbor under the linking rules. This update is done via searches by a bootstrapping group in the old group graphs G j−1 1 and G j−1 2 . Conversely, if G w links to some group G v whose members all depart -note that G v must consist entirely of bad IDs given our model of churn -then G w treats that link as null (until perhaps a join operation requires an update). 13 Groups in the old group graphs G j−1 1 and G j−1 2 do not update links. For an old group graph, if all members of G v depart, G w treats that link as null until the group graph expires.
B. Analysis
In this section, we analyze the construction of new group graphs. Due to space constraints, some of our proofs are provided in our online version [24] .
Properties P1-P4 of input graph H play an important role in the design of the corresponding group graph. However, a prerequisite to these properties is that all IDs are selected uniformly at random (see Section I-C), which is untrue if the adversary chooses to add only some of its bad IDs; for example, maybe only bad IDs in [0, 1 2 ) are added by the adversary. Intuitively, this should not interfere with any of the properties; we now formalize this intuition.
In the following, we consider H to be a modified input graph which uses the same construction as H, but is subject to an adversary that only includes a subset of its IDs, from a larger set of u.a.r. IDs. We note that H is not necessarily a subgraph of H; the omission of bad IDs can result in a different topology. Throughout, the above result is assumed -that properties P1-P4 continue to hold if the adversary includes only a subset of its IDs -even if we do not always make it explicit. For example, P1 is important throughout our arguments/construction, P2 is used in Lemma 6, P4 in Lemma 9, and P3 in Lemma 10.
As described above, for an ID u, there are searches on random key values, via hashing under the random oracle assumption, in order to find members for group G u . But if a key value maps to a bad ID, then this results in a bad member added to the group. We can bound the probability of this event as follows. Lemma 6. W.h.p. a random key value in an old group graph maps to a bad ID with probability at most (1 + δ )β for an arbitrarily small constant δ > 0 depending only on sufficiently large n.
Let q f = O(1/ log k−c n) be the probability that a search for a random key in an old group graph fails; recall Lemma 4. Proof. For a new ID w, there are two ways in which a search for a member of G w may result in a bad ID. First, a search for a group member may fail; that is, the search encounters a bad group. Given a point h 1 (w, i), the probability that both searches in the old group graphs fail is at most q 2 f . By a union bound, the probability of such a dual failure occurring over d 2 ln ln n searches is O(q 2 f d 2 log log n). Second, the search succeeds but returns suc(h(w, i)) where suc(h(w, i)) is a bad ID, even though its group is good. By the random oracle assumption, h(w, i) is a random point. Thus, this event occurs with probability at most (1 + δ )β by Lemma 6, for an arbitrarily small constant δ > 0 given sufficiently large n. Over d 2 ln ln n searches, the expected number of such events is at most (1 + δ )βd 2 ln ln n. The probability of exceeding this expectation by more than a small constant factor (and adding too many bad IDs) is O(1/ log d n) by a Chernoff bound, where the constant d > 0 is tunable depending only on sufficiently large d 2 .
Finally, the ID being asked to join may reject the request. This occurs if both searches used to verify the request fail. By a union bound, this happens with probability at most O(q 2 f d 2 log log n).
A blue group G w should link to all groups in the neighbor set L w . Recall that |L w | = O(log γ n) for some constant γ > 0. If G w (1) links to any group not in L w , or (2) fails to link to any group in L w , then G w is said to be confused. We can bound the probability of a confused group; the proof is provided in our online version [24] .
Lemma 8. Each group in a new group graph is confused independently with probability at most O(q 2 f log γ n). We now prove that w.h.p. each new group graph is ε-robust. Lemma 9. Assume the old group graphs are ε-robust and that the adversary has at most βn u.a.r. IDs. Then, for k ≥ 2c + γ, w.h.p., each new group graph is ε-robust.
Proof. In our analysis, a group that is bad or confused is a red group; otherwise, the group is good and not confused, and this a blue group. To show ε-robustness of the new group graph, we prove that the probability of creating a red group in the new group graph is at most p f ≤ 1/ log k n for a tunable constant k > 0. By Lemmas 7 and 8, each group is red independently with probability at most:
The last line follows by setting d 2 to be sufficiently large such that d exceeds k. Note that d 2 is fixed at the beginning and never needs to be changed throughout the lifetime of the network. Then, setting k > 2c + γ to be a sufficiently large constant yields the necessary value of p f to establish the inequality. This implies that all but an o(1)-fraction of groups are good and not confused. Furthermore, once we have this bound on p f , the remaining proof is equivalent to that of Lemma 4.
The next lemma bounds the amount of state a good ID maintains due to (1) membership in groups, and (2) being a neighbor of a group. This is done by analyzing the verification process described in Section III-A; see [24] for the proof.
Lemma 10. In expectation, each good ID w in a group graph is a member of O(log log n) groups and maintains state on O(|L w |) groups that are either neighbors or have w as a neighbor.
We can now prove Theorem 3. Proof. Lemma 9 guarantees w.h.p. that in the new group graphs, all but a 1/poly(log n)-fraction of groups are good, and all but a 1/poly(log n)-fraction of IDs can search for all but a 1/poly(log n)-fraction of the resources.
Given that groups have size O(log log n), it follows that group communication incurs O((log log n) 2 ) messages. Recall that secure routing proceeds via all-to-all communication between members of groups and that searches have maximum length D (P1 in Section I-C). Thus, the message complexity is O(D(log log n) 2 ).
To bound the expected state cost, we invoke Lemma 10. Each good ID w belongs to O(log log n) groups in expectation. This implies O((log log n) 2 ) expected state cost to keep track of the members of these groups.
In terms of links to and from other groups, w maintains state on O(|L w |) groups in expectation. The constructions for H defined in [39] , [19] , or [32] provide the properties P1-P4, but with a bound of O(1) expected degree. Using any of these constructions, the state cost incurred by these neighboring groups is O(log log n) in expectation. Thus, the total expected state cost is O((log log n) 2 )+O(log log n) = O((log log n) 2 ). Corollary 1 follows immediately.
IV. COMPUTATIONAL PUZZLES Up to this point, we have assumed that the adversary can inject into each new group graph at most βn bad IDs with u.a.r. values, and that these IDs can be verified and forced to expire after a period of time; recall our discussion in Section I-C. We now remove these assumptions. Given space constraints, we limit our discussion to the main ideas of how to use computational puzzles to guarantee these properties.
A. Generating an ID
All participants are assumed to know two secure hash functions, f and g, with range and domain [0, 1) and that both hash functions satisfy the random oracle assumption.
In the current epoch i, ID w is assumed to possess a "globally-known" random string r i−1 of ln n bits. By "globally-known", we mean known to all good IDs except the 1/poly(log n)-fraction from our earlier analysis. We motivate r i−1 and describe how it is generated in Subsection IV-B.
Starting at step T/2 in the current epoch, each good ID begins generating a new ID for use in the next epoch, as described below.
Description of ID Generation. To generate an ID, a good ID w selects a value σ w of ln n random bits (matching the length of r i−1 ). Then, w XORs these two strings to get σ w ⊕ r i−1 , and checks if g(σ w ⊕ r i−1 ) ≤ τ ; if so, then f (g(σ w ⊕ r i−1 )) is a valid ID. We assume the value τ is set small enough such that w.h.p. (1 ± )T/2 steps are required to find a σ w that satisfies this inequality, where > 0 is a tunable (small) positive constant and T > 0 is a parameter set when the system is initialized.
The value of T can be large to amortize the cost of forcing IDs to depart (and possibly rejoin) over a long period of time; for example, T > n, since new group graphs are being built over T steps. Given an application domain, designers may estimate the rate of churn for their application and set a (loose) upper bound on n, then they can set T accordingly.
Why Use Two Hash Functions? Consider using a single secure hash function f to assign IDs; that is, if g(x) < τ, then x is a valid ID. Then, for example, the adversary may restrict itself to small inputs x in order to confine its solutions to yielding small IDs. In other words, the IDs obtained by the adversary will not be u.a.r. from [0, 1). This can be solved via composing two secure hash functions, f and g, as described above. See [24] for the proof of the following: Lemma 11. W.h.p., the adversary generates at most (1+ )βn IDs over (1 ± )(T/2) steps and these IDs are u.a.r. in [0, 1).
We note that Lemma 11 implies that the adversary might be able to generate up to 3(1 + )βn IDs for use in the next epoch: computing over the T/2 steps in the last half of the previous epoch and the T steps prior to the end of the current epoch. However, we can revise the adversary's power from β to β/3, and results in Sections II and III hold. Note that all such IDs will be invalidated when the next random string is created.
ID Verification. Upon receiving a message from some ID w, a good ID u verifies w's ID. This could be done naively by having w send σ w to u who checks that g(σ w ⊕ r i−1 ) ≤ τ and that f (g(σ w ⊕ r i−1 )) evaluates correctly to the claimed ID (note that u already has r i since it is globally-known). Unfortunately, this allows u to steal σ w if u is bad.
To avoid this issue, we can use a zero-knowledge scheme for revealing the pre-image of the hashing; such a scheme is provided for the SHA family [25] . This allows w to prove the validity of σ w without revealing it.
If w's ID fails verification, then u simply ignores w going forward. Note that w's current ID will not be valid in the next epoch since it is signed by the older string r i−1 (rather than the next globally-known random string r i ); that is, w's ID will have expired. IDs that are not verified are effectively removed from the system; they may consort with bad IDs, but they have no interactions with good IDs.
B. Generating Global Random Strings
Imagine if no random string was used in the creation of IDs described above in Subsection IV-A. The adversary would know the format of the ID-generation puzzles, and so could spend time computing a large number of IDs, and then use these IDs all at once to overwhelm the system at some future point. This is a pre-computation attack.
Signing IDs with a random string prevents such an attack as it is impossible for the adversary to know far in advance how to generate IDs. We provide a protocol where random strings are generated and propagated in the system to be used in ID generation. Due to space constraints, this content is provided in our online version [24] . We show the following: Lemma 12. W.h.p., the protocol for propagating strings (i) guarantees that, for each good ID w, its string used for generating an ID is known to each good ID, (ii) the number of strings stored by each ID is O(ln n), and (iii) has message complexityÕ(n ln T ).
Note that, averaged over a sufficiently large epoch, this message cost is low.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We showed that groups of size O(log log n) can be used to tolerate a powerful Byzantine adversary. Our result utilizes PoW to limit the number of IDs the adversary controls; however, this imposes a computational overhead on participants. An open question is whether the computational costs can be reduced. Might there be a way to avoid the continual solving of puzzles? Is there an approach that would only utilize puzzle solving when malicious IDs are present? Recent work in [22] demonstrates how this can be achieved in certain decentralized systems, but it is unclear whether a similar approach can work in our setting.
Another problem that deserves attention is providing a detailed mechanism for bootstrapping in the presence of a Byzantine adversary. Such a result would likely benefit prior work as well as our own; we discuss this in our online version [24] .
Finally, is it possible to show a lower bound on group size of Ω(log log n)? We provided intuition for why this may be the smallest group size that admits strong security guarantees, but proving this appears challenging.
